Liverpool vs. Tottenham Tactical Analysis
On Wednesday, Liverpool and Tottenham played out a crucial midweek fixture that could have lasting implications on the current Premier League campaign. At the time that this match was played, the sides found themselves in first and second respectively, separated only by goal difference. But after Liverpool’s win, they have moved ahead of Spurs and now sit top of the league for the first time this season.
This blockbuster fixture was always going to provide a spark. Both managers are so tactically adept, yet they play with such contrasting tactical styles. These distinct and defined tactical philosophies were apparent in this match.
Formations:
The big surprise from the off was the fact that Jose Mourinho opted for a 4-4-2 formation as opposed to his typical 4-2-3-1. Spurs had started the season superbly using the 4-2-3-1 but Mourinho felt the need to go for something with more defensive security against such a potent offensive side.
Mourinho was clearly looking to solidify his side in the wide areas. By employing a 4-4-2, it seems as if he was hoping that doubling up on the flanks would limit the threat of Liverpool’s dynamic full-back duo. It’s interesting that he went with Sissoko on the right-hand side of his midfield four. In many ways, this shows the defensive nature of Jose’s team selection.
While he had players such as Lucas Moura and Dele Alli on the bench, who he could’ve included in forward areas, he preferred the grit and determination that Sissoko would offer on the right. This shows that Mourinho was looking to his wingers to provide cover for his side’s full-backs, rather than providing an offensive spark down the other end. Even Bergwijn on the left was positioned defensively throughout the match despite being known for a more attacking style.
This opening tactical selection and choice of personnel helped set the tone for the match from the beginning.
Tactically, this match played out almost exactly as you might have expected. Tottenham made absolutely no attempt to hang on to the ball, lumping it up the field at every opportunity. They were ruthless and direct, looking to use the physicality of their two frontmen to get in behind and force an error.
Liverpool on the other hand were calm and measured in their passing play, looking confident as ever. They kept an incredible 76% of possession. This meant that the majority of their game was spent trying to break down the solid defensive unit that Spurs were operating with.
As always, Liverpool looked to progress the play through the wide areas, using their full-backs as a source of creativity. However, Spurs’s 4-4-2 forced Liverpool to try and play through the middle at times. While Spurs created a few massive chances through their direct gameplay, Liverpool were able to dominate the match, and eventually came out on top due to their sustained pressure, both through the middle and out wide.
Spurs Defensively
Given how thoroughly Liverpool dominated the match, this game was really based on Spurs’ capacity to defend. I’ve already mentioned the significance of Mourinho’s formational choice in regards to Spurs as a defensive unit and the game as a whole. Now, let’s take a deeper look into the tactical choices that Mourinho made defensively in order to attempt to stop one of the best attacks in Europe.
Like mentioned earlier, Mourinho was clearly worried about the threat that Liverpool’s full-backs posed ahead of the match. For the first time this season, he employed a 4-4-2 formation.
Spurs used their two wide midfielders to attempt to nullify the threat of Robertson and Alexander-Arnold. This meant that Tottenham’s wide midfield players ended up operating much deeper than they would have hoped. The bombing runs of Liverpool’s full-backs kept them deep inside their own halves, playing almost as wing-backs at points.
This also meant that Spurs played an incredibly horizontal version of a 4-4-2. Whereas typically in the modern game, teams who employ 4-4-2 formations tend to operate with a compact midfield line of four, Spurs were forced to play wide, as their midfielders were clearly instructed to prioritize Liverpool’s wing-backs.
Here you can see just how stretched Spurs’ midfield four were. In this instance, Sissoko is closing down Robertson on Spurs’ right. On the opposite flank, Alexander-Arnold is helping to stretch the field for Liverpool. He maintains his wide position, even whilst the ball is on the other side of the pitch.
Bergwijn, however, stays with the Liverpool right-back. This is actually quite unusual. In most cases, wingers in a 4-4-2 will drop into the center when the ball is on the opposite wing. This almost creates a temporary midfield three which can help to solidify the center of the park in a formation that only operates with two central midfielders. When the ball is switched, the other winger will come centrally.
But Spurs operated with a different tactic. Instead of focusing their numbers in the center of the pitch, they kept a close eye on the Liverpool full-back pairing that has accumulated 48 assists between them over the last two seasons. This meant keeping one player on each wing at all times in order to ensure that they weren’t caught out by a switch of play.
To allow for this, Spurs kept their full-backs centrally. This can be seen in the image above, where both Aurier and Davies have pinched in in order to track the runs of the Liverpool wingers and provide support to the central defenders. Interestingly, you can also see how wide Bergwign is in this situation, almost creating a five at the back.
Rather intelligently, Spurs did this in order to track Liverpool’s most dangerous players. Their two wingers were able to stay tight on Liverpool’s full-backs, while Aurier and Davies attempted to nullify the presence of Mane and Salah. Liverpool’s wingers are well known for playing incredibly centrally, almost as strikers at times, in order to allow their full-backs to hug the flanks.
This meant that Tottenham set up their shape in response to this. In theory, this should have worked quite well.
Liverpool in Possession
In many ways, Tottenham’s altered defensive shape did limit Liverpool’s attacking prowess. However, Klopp’s side masterminded the game expertly and found little ways to take advantage of Mourinho’s system.
Most impressively was perhaps the fact that Liverpool were still able to find space in the wide areas. Despite Tottenham’s best efforts, Liverpool were able to create chances from the flanks. While many sides would have looked to play through the middle instead, Klopp ensured that his side played to his philosophies and weren’t deterred by Spurs’ change in shape.
In order to do this Liverpool implemented the use of a third man runner coming from midfield.
The image above shows a prime example of this. In this instance, Liverpool have the ball rather centrally and are attempting to play into the right flank. You can see that Alexander-Arnold has kept a rather reserved position with Bergwign tracking him, while Salah is dropping into a more central space, dragging Ben Davies with him. This is where Spurs’ rigid marking scheme caused their downfall.
Just as Salah is dropping in, central midfielder Curtis Jones makes a dynamic run towards the flank and in behind Davies. Although Spurs have two men in the wide areas, Liverpool commit a third to the right flank and were able to find space. Instead of looking for less populated areas, Liverpool decided to fight even harder to find space out wide.
Throughout the match, they consistently looked to create 3v2 situations on the flanks. They employed their midfield advantage incredibly intelligently. Whereas typically they would look to go 2v1 in the wide areas using a full-back and a winger, in this match they were forced to commit an extra man from midfield in order to gain that same numerical advantage
However, it wasn’t only through the third man runs that they created these situations. They also had their midfield players pull wide to create triangles on the flanks.
While the third man runs were made occasionally, more frequently a midfield player would drop behind the full-back and winger, and act as a playmaker. This can be seen in the example above, where Curtis Jones has dropped into the wide areas to facilitate play. Yet again, this would create a 3v2 in the wide areas.
Jones was absolutely crucial in this. The 19-year-old had a superb match in midfield. Jones was everywhere on the night, completing 105 passes which was the most on the pitch. His 2 key passes were only bettered by Robertson who completed 4. He also managed a 94% passing accuracy. Despite his age, he dominated the game, taking control from his midfield position.
Jones was required to be more dynamic. While Henderson and Wijnaldum dropped in, holding their positions, Jones moved from side to side, assisting on either flank. Due to the fact that Tottenham only employed two central midfielders, Jones was able to play in this roaming manner with little consequence. He acted as a free man in the middle of the park and was incredibly effective.
Roberto Firmino was also crucial in allowing Jones to operate in this role. Although Liverpool’s main focus was on gaining an advantage on the wings, they also exploited the center intelligently.
One of the main reasons that Jones was able to roam so freely was because of Firmino’s movement in the center. Firmino, of course, is well known for his ability to drop deep as Liverpool’s striker, and he did that to great effect in this match. Tottenham were incredibly light in the center given their formation, so Firmino had more time and space when he moved into midfield.
This movement meant that Jones was able to leave his central position to assist in the wide areas or, on occasion, take up Firmino’s role as a striker. Firmino’s movement ensured that even when Jones moved wide, Liverpool still had a numerical advantage in the center.
In the instance shown above, Liverpool were attempting to overload the left side of the field. However, when Lo Celso moved to help his winger, Jones shifted his attention to the middle of the park, to the space in which Firmino had just dropped into.
Having come off of the backline, Firmino was unmarked by an opposing midfielder. He exchanged a one-two with Jones, who was able to get in behind the midfield line. Liverpool were able to draw Tottenham into the wide areas, before moving into the vacant center and going on to score.
In this image, you can also see how Liverpool were able to overload Tottenham’s midfield when they needed to. You can see that Firmino’s positioning created a 3v2 in midfield to Liverpool’s advantage, with Wijnaldum free of a marker. Although they didn’t use the Dutchmen in this instance, they were able to overload Spurs in this manner throughout the match, helping them to pose a threat and maintain possession.
The final thing to notice when looking at this situation is Henderson’s positioning. Henderson, of course, was operating as Liverpool’s deepest midfield player in this match. However, he often took up a role in a makeshift back three.
This was the final major feature of Liverpool’s possession play on the night. You can see here that Liverpool’s two central defenders shifted to the left, in order to let Henderson slot in as a third defender. This allowed Henderson time and space on the ball from which he could dictate possession.
Spurs weren’t all that active in their pressing and typically allowed Liverpool to maintain possession well into their opponents’ half. They attempted to remain compact vertically and they gave Liverpool’s center backs plenty of time on the ball. This meant that Henderson could drop back into this zone, receiving little to no pressure.
Henderson used this space to act as Liverpool’s primary playmaker. While Wijnaldum and Jones were more dynamic, assisting in the wide areas, Henderson would drop into the right side of a back three to play longer balls or help his side keep possession. Given Firmino’s role as an attacking-midfielder of sorts, Henderson was able to drop into the backline without affecting his side’s midfield advantage.
Spurs on the Counter
As could be inferred from Liverpool’s obscene possession stats from this match, the majority of Spurs’ attacking play came on the break. In fact, they didn’t care in the slightest about maintaining possession. Their pass success rate was an astonishing 61%, while their player with the most passes, Hojbjerg, completed just 19 on the night. This was 15 lower than the lowest Liverpool outfield player.
But on the break, it has to be said, they were quite successful. Incredibly, despite keeping only 24% of the ball, Spurs ended the game with more expected goals than the Reds, playing typical Mourinho-ball. They attempted to use the strength of Kane and the pace of Son to get in behind the Liverpool backline.
As you might expect, Kane was the main target for their long balls. He generally took up the most advanced position when Spurs were out of possession and was, therefore, best placed when Spurs won the ball back and looked to play upfield. Son played slightly off of him, looking to make runs in behind to get the second ball. Another thing to notice was the fact that Spurs looked to overload the left side of the field.
You can see here that Kane, Son, and Bergwijn are all positioned out on the left. Spurs used Bergwijn intelligently when attacking. The Dutchman is known for his pace both on and off the ball, so he was used in a more dynamic role on the left-hand side. While Sissoko played conservatively, Bergwijn was given the license to run beyond Kane and Son.
In the instance shown above, Spurs’ plan worked to perfection. The long ball was won by Kane initially who was able to flick it on to Son who had run beyond him. Son also won his aerial duel, putting Bergwijn in behind for a one-on-one with Alisson. Spurs employed large numbers on the left side, which allowed them to get to the second and third ball.
This tactic led to their two biggest chances on the night. The situation shown above was the second. The first led to Son’s goal. In that instance, Kane started on the left but pulled out to the right once Lo Celso decided to bring the ball out instead of playing it long. Then, as Son began to drift towards the left, Bergwijn made a darting run towards the center, bringing his marker with him and leaving the left flank vacant for a ball to be slipped through.
Conclusion
Both teams could have grabbed this game and the three points. Although Liverpool came away with the win, both sides executed their gameplans successfully and both managers will have been happy with their sides’ performances.
Liverpool knew what they were going to be up against in terms of Mourinho’s defensively-oriented style of play, and they were able to counter that. However, Spurs were direct and efficient, and arguably created the better of the opportunities.
In the end, it was Liverpool’s persistent pressure that won the match. They took more than double Spurs’ shots and managed to get 11 on target to boot. Although they didn’t create the same quality of chance as Mourinho’s men, they were given far too much time to find gaps in Spurs’ defensively astute formation.
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