Manchester City vs. Liverpool Tactical Analysis
After last weekend’s crucial clash at the Etihad, the Premier League has now been put into a more specific context regarding the season ahead. On Sunday, Manchester City and Liverpool played out a 1-1 draw that could have lasting implications on this Premier League campaign. Despite neither team being at the top of the table for the time being, you’d expect both of these clubs to be battling it out for the Premier League title come May.
With that being said, let’s look into how the match played out, noticing some crucial tactical features of each side’s game.
Formations
The immediate thing to notice when looking at the formations of the respective teams is that both managers went for 4-2-4 shapes. While in the past Klopp and Pep have typically set their sides up in 4-3-3 formations, they both felt the need to change things ahead of this vital fixture.
For City, this change meant playing Kevin De Bruyne in a more advanced starting positions, drifting in behind the main striker. For Liverpool, this shift was largely due to the fantastic form of new signing Diogo Jota, and Klopp’s desire to use all four of his fantastic attacking options.
The inclusion of four attacking players from each manager meant that it was always going to be packed with action; however, it was slightly less attack-minded than one might have thought. Both managers took rather conservative approaches in some areas, which meant it was less free-flowing than this fixture has been over the past couple of seasons.
City had the majority of the ball but struggled to create many meaningful opportunities. Liverpool were also rather lackluster creatively. Although they looked more threatening throughout the match they didn’t perfect their play in the final third, which ended up costing them a couple of points. The sides took a combined total of just 17 shots, with both teams failing to find a consistent attacking rhythm.
Liverpool in the Press
Much of this was due to how Liverpool set up defensively, and in particular, their modified pressing set up. Given their switch to a 4-2-4, bringing a player out of midfield to play as a striker, it was always going to be interesting to see how they would line up in the press. Overall, they did quite well in this regard and managed to limit City for much of the match.
In truth City’s formational change worked to Liverpool’s advantage. Liverpool’s pressing shape was perfectly suited to counter City’s shape in transition. Liverpool used their two strikers to great effect, cutting off the angle to City’s double-pivot in midfield.
You can see here that Liverpool were content to let City play between their two central defenders. However, they heavily marked the next line of City players. Liverpool’s two strikers can be seen clearly trying to isolate City’s midfield players from the match. While Liverpool’s wingers are also cutting off passing options, the main focus for Liverpool was to stop City’s midfield players from getting on the ball.
This forced Gundogan to drop deeper several times, trying to get involved somehow in the match.
However, Liverpool were perfectly content to sit back, allowing City to play around in their defensive third. Liverpool’s attacking four kept their line, shifting from left to right as City moved the ball around.
Thus, Gundogan’s attempt to advance play was limited and largely ineffective. This is what City struggled with throughout the match. Their midfield players who are usually so influential in their system were forced to play a peripheral role. Gundogan, who averaged 87 passes per 90 in the Premier League last season, completed just 60 passes in this match. Rodri was thwarted similarly. Last season he averaged 93 passes per 90 but in this game, he completed just 56.
And it’s not like this was due to a lack of possession for the home side. City kept 55% of the ball but seemed unable to get it into their central midfield players. Liverpool’s pressing scheme was crucial in this, and it contributed largely to their overall defensive gameplan. While their press wasn’t as typically aggressive, they managed to limit City’s midfield presence, and make it difficult for City to progress the ball on the night.
Liverpool Defensively
As it’s always been with Klopp’s Liverpool, the Reds’ press was the starting point on which the rest of their defensive philosophy was built. They did an incredible job overall in making sure that City couldn’t receive the ball in dangerous areas. While they made sure that City’s two defensive midfield players were quiet, they also managed to nullify the threat of Kevin De Bruyne.
By marking City’s double-pivot with their two strikers, Liverpool’s midfielders ended up with a numerical advantage when going up against City’s star-man De Bruyne. The Belgian played in close proximity to main City striker Gabriel Jesus but was drifting in and around the attacking midfield zone. However, Liverpool made sure that they were well set up to deal with him.
If anything, this was probably City’s biggest weakness on the night. They really struggled to get the ball into De Bruyne’s feet. Despite having just two central midfield players, they were able to sit back and focus on De Bruyne, given the deep starting positions of the forwards. Also, Liverpool did superbly to decrease the passing lanes into the center of the park.
You can see here how narrow Liverpool’s front four were playing. This made it incredibly difficult for the Cityzens to find any sort of space in the center. With Liverpool’s two strikers playing so conservatively, Liverpool were almost operating with four in the middle of the park, with two narrow wingers helping them out to boot.
You can also see how compact Liverpool are making the pitch through the use of their midfield. Quite frequently, Liverpool were prepared to give De Bruyne space in between the midfield and defensive line, as they knew that they could block off his passing lanes while also closing the space.
Here, De Bruyne is in between the lines but Liverpool’s narrow midfield block of four prevent a passing lane into the attacking midfielder. Something else that was apparent during the match was this bubble of space, indicated above by the red circle. Although Liverpool’s shape was incredibly compact, their 4-2-2-2 set up of sorts led to an opening in the center.
However, if a player were to receive the ball in this zone, Liverpool would have six players around the man ready to converge. Also, the ball was rarely played into this zone, due to what was mentioned earlier regarding the way in which Liverpool shut down central passing lanes. All of this combined forced De Bruyne out of the game and the Belgian ended up roaming aimlessly, often finding himself in the wide areas.
While he was able to get on the ball more often in these wide positions, he was far less effective than he would’ve been in his typical central role. You can see in the image above, just how tightly Liverpool marked up on the flanks.
This was another important feature of Liverpool’s defensive play. As a formation, the 4-4-2 has become synonymous with security in the wide areas, and this was shown through Liverpool’s tactical set up in this match. Liverpool managed to shut down the central areas but this didn’t cost them their security on either wing.
Their wingers were crucial to this. We saw earlier how narrow they played in the press, which limited space in the center when creating a 4-2-2-2 shape. However, when City were able to progress slightly further forwards, Liverpool’s wingers dropped off in order to create a typical 4-4-2. The consistent work rate from Liverpool’s wingers meant that they were able to provide cover to both the two strikers in the press and the full-backs when the ball was put into the wide areas.
City frequently looked wide to try and find space, after quickly realizing that their central lanes were cut off. However, only once or twice during the match did they manage to bypass Liverpool’s wingers. Luckily for them, they were clinical in these instances, and their goal came from a situation in which Mane was pressing, leaving Liverpool’s left flank exposed.
Mane wasn’t able to return to his left-wing position quickly enough. The ball was sprayed out to Kyle Walker on the right-hand side, forcing Liverpool central midfielder Wijnaldum to cover him.
This gave De Bruyne a brief pocket of space in the center, which he used to devastating effect as he often does. This moment really highlighted the importance of Liverpool’s wide men in the match and to a large extent their effectiveness. In the one instance in which Mane switched off, Liverpool were caught out and punished, which meant they had to split the points on the night.
Liverpool Offensively
Liverpool’s other big weakness was their relative lack of creativity. Compared to their average Premier League performance, they were incredibly lackluster in the final third. Obviously, a lot of this has to go down to the quality of their opposition; however, some of this was due to their tactical shape.
While you would associate their 4-2-4 with being an incredibly offensive formation, the way in which Klopp employed it meant that it was actually far more cautious than their typical 4-3-3. This was mainly due to their aforementioned pressing style. Whereas they usually push their opposition incredibly far back into their own half, they allowed Manchester City to play out from the back. This low pressing intensity was shown by the fact that City were allowed 30 passes per defensive action. To put this in context, Liverpool averaged just 11 over the course of the match.
This meant that they not only kept less possession than they typically do but also that they were occupying the ball in less dangerous areas when they did have it. Instead of forcing turnovers within City’s half, Liverpool were forced to try and build out from their own defensive third. They often won the ball back after City attempted to play long, which meant that a lot more of their possession came in deeper areas.
Against their average Premier League opponent, Liverpool thrive at winning the ball high up the pitch. However, in this match against Manchester City, due to their pressing system, they were able to win the ball back in their own half but not in threatening areas.
I think this harmed them creatively, as they’re usually so good at breaking quickly after winning the ball back high up the pitch. Without the ability to do this, they struggled slightly. A lot has been made about the lack of creativity in their midfield. While this is rarely an issue for the Reds, it’s in matches like this that Liverpool could use a deeper creative player to help them get the ball into more advanced positions.
City’s Press
While we’ve talked extensively about the effectiveness of Liverpool’s press in terms of providing them defensive security, Manchester City’s press provided an interesting contrast. City, by all means, were far more aggressive in their pressing. Despite using similar formations, it was interesting to see how uniquely each team performed based on their pressing system. City were pressing to attack, while Liverpool were pressing to defend.
While Liverpool let their forwards hang back, focusing on limiting space for City’s central midfielders, City were far more active, looking to force giveaways at the back. While their wide players came narrow, similarly to Liverpool, their front two of Jesus and De Bruyne looked to try and dispossess Liverpool’s two center-backs.
You can see here that even when Liverpool were deep in their own box, City were looking to close down their space, with De Bruyne pressing Joe Gomez in this instance. However, City’s press wasn’t entirely aggressive. Typically, they allowed one of their front four to step forward on the man with the ball, while the other three dropped back, providing support but not actively pressing.
They still held this line quite high though, and particularly when Liverpool tried to move the ball into midfield, they converged on the ball. This was another crucial aspect of Manchester City’s press. They used their central midfield players in an incredibly aggressive manner, playing almost just in behind the front four.
Here you can see that, when De Bruyne was caught pressing too far forwards, Gundogan was on hand to push up into his position. City’s midfield players generally kept advanced starting positions throughout the match, looking to smother Liverpool’s two central midfielders.
This is something that we didn’t see from Liverpool’s midfielders in the match. Henderson and Wijnaldum were able to sit deeper and cover spaces due to the defensive work from the forwards in front of them. Gundogan and Rodrigo were required to be more energetic, and look to close down space.
This was the main difference between the sides. Liverpool’s conservative gameplan made them incredibly difficult to break down but also limited their creative threat. City attempted to play on the front foot, using De Bruyne in an advanced role. However, they found their possession play to be rather feeble, struggling to get the ball into De Bruyne in dangerous areas but also failing to make much of an impact from out wide.
Liverpool probably executed their game plan more effectively, but fell short in a few areas. While they certainly created more opportunities, these chances didn’t come consistently enough. City certainly made it difficult for them though, using their high-intensity press to disrupt Liverpool’s possession play and keep the game largely in their hands.
The shots and chances in the match were limited but it was still an intense and technical tactical battle. Both managers felt the need to change up their tactical arrangements ahead of this crucial fixture which added an extra element of excitement to the match. This really was another Pep and Klopp classic. Although the goals didn’t necessarily flow as they usually do, it was still clear to see that the two best teams, and best managers, in the league were up against each other. On the basis of the night, 1-1 would probably be considered a fair result.
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