What has Gone Wrong at West Ham

What has Gone Wrong at West Ham

The season started with hope, but a hope that has quickly deteriorated.

After a promising summer window, the Hammers looked set to build on their impressive 10th place finish from the season prior. Pellegrini’s inaugural campaign as West Ham boss warranted relative success, and West Ham fans were left expecting more of the same.

In truth, Pellegrini was sacked in December, with his side sat in 17th at the time. Now, with just 9 games left of the Premier League season, West Ham are in 16th place, only separated from the relegation zone by goal difference. Pellegrini’s managerial replacement, David Moyes, has been uninspiring to say the least, as he has failed to ensure West Ham’s safety as we look towards the end of the season.

First of all, let’s look at how it began. West Ham actually started the season quite well, losing just once in their opening seven games in a match against Manchester City. In fact, at that point in the season, West Ham were surprisingly sat in 5th, having gained more points than the likes of Tottenham, Chelsea and Manchester United.

Over this seven game period, Pellegrini used almost exclusively a 4-1-4-1, which would switch over to a 4-2-3-1 on occasion. In midfield, Rice provided a base, while Fornals and Noble played ahead of him. However, while Fornals operated as an out-and-out attacking midfielder, Noble would drop deeper defensively, acting as a box-to-box midfield player.

The aim of the system was to get the full-backs high up the pitch, in order to allow more freedom for players like Felipe Anderson and Andriy Yarmolenko. With the full-backs pushing forwards, West Ham’s wingers were allowed to come centrally, where they could pose more of a threat.

For a while this was effective, with Yarmolenko in particular enjoying his role as an inside forward. However, after this early run of form, West Ham and Pellegrini began running into problems when coming up against deeper defences. After winning three of their first six in the Premier League, West Ham then went on a run of 7 matches without a win, including 5 losses during this spell.

During this period, they lost to Crystal Palace, Newcastle and Burnley, as well as drawing with Sheffield United, all teams who have operated with low-blocks this season. In each of these four matches, West Ham had the majority of the possession. In fact, they averaged 61% possession over these games.

However, this proved to be to their detriment. Against these deeper defensive units West Ham struggled to create space in attacking areas. A prime example of this came in their match against Burnley, in which they lost 3-0. Despite keeping 60% of the possession, they were limited to just 7 shots in the match.

In the image above, Burnley’s compact defensive nature is apparent. By remaining narrow, Burnley limited much of West Ham’s attacking threat. Felipe Anderson and Yarmolenko weren’t able to combine centrally, due to the way Burnley crowded the box and the central areas. Because of this, West Ham were forced into the wide areas frequently, where they found little success.

This was typified by striker Sebastian Haller’s performance. Haller attempted 23 aerial duels on the night, more than his season average of 16.9. However, his aerial win rate of just 39% in the match was well below his average of 51% for the year. As West Ham were forced to play with a more direct “crossing-based” approach, they struggled to find success against Burnley’s aerially dominant central defenders. West Ham were pushed out of the central areas, but ineffective when moved to the flanks.

Similar things can be said about a number of their games during this period. Against these deeper defensive units, they struggled to find the space they wanted in central areas of the field. In addition to this, they were largely exposed on the counter-attack.

Due to the attacking nature of their system, West Ham were often caught out on the break during this poor run of form. Particularly in the middle of the park, West Ham were easily exposed. Playing in a 4-1-4-1, Declan Rice acted as the only cover for the backline. As for the other midfield players, one was stationed in a more attacking position, while Noble was rather ineffective playing in a box-to-box role.

At 32 years old, Noble has lost some of his old athleticism and mobility. As a result of this, his defensive numbers have seen a significant drop over recent seasons. Just two years ago, Noble was averaging 3.8 tackles and interceptions per 90 in the Premier League. Now, this is at just 2.4. Noble is seemingly no longer fit enough to be defensively effective in such a dynamic role.

In this role, he also has very little protection. With the full-backs pushing high as well, West Ham are left with very little defensive support. Because of this, they struggled against some of the stronger counter-attacking sides.

After losing to Burnley on November 11th, West Ham were in 16th, with a tough run of games coming up. And after losing at home to Tottenham the week later, Pellegrini opted to alter his tactical approach.

West Ham became more cautious, in order to solve their glaring defensive issues. Noble was dropped alongside Declan Rice in a double-pivot, while Fornals and Felipe Anderson switched roles.

With Snodgrass coming into the side to replace Yarmolenko on the right, West Ham were operating in a 4-4-1-1, with a narrow midfield four. Fornals and Snodgrass on the wings were instructed to come centrally throughout the match, while Felipe Anderson remained in a free role behind the striker.

In the image above, you can see that West Ham were clearly set up in two organized blocks of four. In this example, Snodgrass is seen pinching in to deal with Chelsea’s midfield player, rather than marking their opposing full-back. This was typical of the formation, with the main goal being to make the field as compact as possible when defending.

In this match against Chelsea, West Ham actually came out victorious. In their first game using this new formation, they won their first Premier League match in over two months. Their 1-0 victory symbolized a new mentality, and a more defensive mindset. However, they didn’t settle on this 4-4-1-1. Over their next five matches, they used this formation on just two occasions.

They proceeded to lose four of their next five in the league, and Manuel Pellegrini was sacked after a 1-2 home loss to Leicester. By the end of his spell with the Hammers, the Chilean was frequently chopping and changing the formation, clearly running out of ideas on how to bring success to his side.

He used three different formations over his last four Premier League games with the club, only producing one win during this spell. Although the season started well under Pellegrini, the rough patches that his side hit in the middle of the season led to his sacking, and the appointment of David Moyes.

And it’s safe to say, the Hammers have picked up where they left off. While David Moyes has established a reputation for helping teams beat the drop, his West Ham side have made very little progress since his arrival, at least in terms of results.

West Ham have now played ten games under their new manager, and have recorded just two wins. In terms of the tactics that Moyes has employed, it’s been fairly mixed.

His brief experiments with a five at the back formation went horribly wrong, as his side have lost all 4 matches when using five defenders. When discounting these matches, he actually has a decent record in charge, with two wins and two draws in six games.

When using five defenders, West Ham’s back five played flat and high. Even against Manchester City in this example, they set their defensive line outside of the box. While this can be effective for certain teams, it doesn’t suit the personnel at West Ham.

Their backline is not particularly quick, especially in central areas. By operating with this high line, they invite teams to play through them, and look to play into the space in behind. This puts a lot of pressure on their defensive players, and is something that is hard to pick up over a few matches.

Also, when using a high line, it’s important to have players who are capable of pressing high. It’s fair to say that West Ham have struggled with this, with many of their players lacking that pressing ability. This made it easier for teams to bypass their midfield and attacking lines, and yet again put more pressure on their defensive players.

In truth, the system was just defensively leaky. West Ham lacked the individual quality across their backline in order to make this system successful. Over the four matches that they played with five at the back, they conceded a total of nine goals.

Because of this, Moyes has recently changed up the system. Although he still seems undecided on how to get the best out of his side, he has now used the same formation over his last two Premier League matches. And interestingly, his side have looked much better in these games, in a system that finally seems to suit the personnel at the club.

Somewhat surprisingly, it’s been a 4-4-2 that has brought this improvement. While his side lost narrowly to Arsenal in their most recent match, they recorded an important 3-1 win over Southampton in the match before, in what was one of their best performances of the season thus far.

Despite maintaining just 34% possession on the night, they won by a comfortable two goal margin, and were the deserved winners. With a pass accuracy of just 59%, the shift in mentality from Moyes’ side has been clear. Instead of attempting to play through the opposition as West Ham did under Pellegrini, Moyes has now adopted a quick and direct counter-attacking approach.

Against Southampton they were brilliant, and they executed their game plan to perfection. They used the physicality of their attacking players to great effect, and were dominant when breaking out from defence. Despite keeping a low amount of possession, they used their possession devastatingly, and made Southampton pay for their mistakes.

By using Haller and Antonio together in a front two, it was always clear what Moyes’ intentions were. By using such a physically dominant pairing, West Ham were always going to be a threat on the counter. In attacking situations, West Ham’s strikers were bullying their opposing central defensive pairing.

Although Antonio isn’t a superb technical player, his pace, strength and energy make him incredibly useful in one-on-one scenarios. For this reason, Moyes gave him a freer role in and around Haller. While he was still very much operating as a striker, he was drifting from side-to-side in order to pick up the ball and make a nuisance of himself. While Haller stayed centrally at almost all times, Antonio was given license to get wide, in order to make use of his startling pace.

Haller’s aerial presence made him useful as the focal point in West Ham’s attack. Against Southampton he won 14 aerial duels, double the next highest on the pitch.

Both Haller and Antonio scored against Southampton, and both goals came as the result of a long-ball being played up to Haller.

Haller’s goal was particularly indicative of the two players’ link up play. After winning the initial header off of a Fornals long ball, Antnio put in a cross for Haller to bundle the ball home.

By pairing these two together, Moyes has set up a perfect base for his system. The physical dominance that they provide up front would cause any defence problems. With the energy of Antonio and the aerial dominance of Haller, West Ham are able to move from back to front quickly and effectively.

However, January signing Jarrod Bowen has also played a crucial role in the attack. After joining from Hull for $22 million, he made his first Premier League start against Southampton. He scored the first goal in the match, and played brilliantly throughout.

Perhaps his acquisition inspired this change in system, as he fits into his right-wing role perfectly. As a left-footed player playing on the right, Bowen has clearly been encouraged to cut inside to gain space. And in the current system, he is operating in a more advanced role, almost level with the strikers when his side are in possession. When at Hull, Bowen was often played in a more advanced role, and was used as a striker on occasion. Moyes is clearly trying to replicate this, by giving him more attacking freedom on the right hand side.

Playing as a right-winger, Bowen’s pace and dribbling ability make him a massive threat on the counter-attack. By playing in a slightly higher role, he is ready to release himself on the break, creating a front three for the Hammers.

Bowen took 4 shots against Southampton, the most on the pitch. He also completed 2 dribbles and made a key pass, clearly having an instant impact on the squad. His desire to get into attacking positions has made a big difference for West Ham over their last couple of matches, as he has provided the x-factor for them.

Defensively, West Ham have also been much more solid when using this formation. The system is inherently more defensive, with the goal being to hit teams on the break. Therefore, a lot of work has been put into the defensive side of the game plan.

This defensive organization was demonstrated in their most recent match against Arsenal. Although they lost the match 1-0, they put in an impressive performance away from home, and largely limited Mikel Arteta’s Gunners. Again, they kept just 31% of possession, but were a threat on the counter. Arsenal managed just 9 shots on the night, while West Ham took 14. This is a great indication of how well West Ham managed this Arsenal side.

By keeping a narrow midfield four, they were able to restrict the impact that players like Ozil and Xhaka could have on the game. Under Arteta, Arsenal have largely progressed the ball through the center of the field, making use of the talent of Xhaka, Ozil and Ceballos.

In the image above you can see how West Ham set out to marshall the Arsenal midfield. While Ozil stuck with Rice, Noble pressured Ceballos, while also cutting off the passing angle to Xhaka. Perhaps most importantly, the wide midfielders came centrally in order to put extra defensive pressure on Arsenal’s midfield players.

For the most part, this was effective. Ozil failed to have an impact on the match, as he was practically man-marked by Rice throughout the course of the game. Despite being the focal point of Arsenal’s attack, Ozil took the 4th lowest amount of touches out of Arsenal’s outfield players. With both Bowen and Fornals pinching in, they allowed Noble to step out of the midfield line, and press his opposing central-midfielder. By doing this, West Ham largely cut off Arsenal’s midfield progression.

They also worked hard to restrict Arsenal’s only other form of progression, through Bukayo Saka on the left. The young left-back has been in scintillating form this season, so they made sure that he was well accounted for.

While Antonio operated on the left against Southampton, he played on the right against Arsenal in order to cut off the passing lanes to Saka. Consequently, the left-back managed just 68 touches, the least of Arsenal’s defensive players.

Although he remained a threat during the match, he was less involved than usual. Especially when building from the back, he was often isolated on the left-hand side, while heavily marked. Because of this, Arsenal lacked some of their usual progression. Just 31% of possession was kept in West Ham’s half, despite their overall lack of possession during the match.

And like mentioned earlier, West Ham edged the shots in the match. They also came out on top in regards to expected goals, with a predicted scoreline of 1.62 to 1.56. However, a late, slightly fortunate, goal from Arsenal settled the match, and West Ham were forced to walk away having taken nothing from the fixture.

Despite the final result, the Hammers put in another solid display with their new formation. While their game against Southampton highlighted their lethal attacking play, the Arsenal match demonstrated their organized defensive structure.

In what has been a troubling season for West Ham, they have often lacked a system with balance. Either they have attacked without defensive cover, or they have defended without a plan to attack. But now, in Moyes’ 4-4-2, they look more capable than ever.

Although they’ll be preparing for a relegation dogfight, it’s quite possible that they’ll survive comfortably. While they’ve always had talented personnel at their disposal, only now do they have the system to match that personnel.